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Looking for change
Reform of residential services sector is
going very slowly in Ukraine. The quality of
services remains unsatisfactory and—what’s
more important—the proper conditions for
improving the sector are not in place. With
the list of objects for privatization steadily
shrinking, state costs for maintaining
residential services rising, and the
dissatisfaction of residents with the quality
of services growing daily, the stage is set for
private providers to come in.
Sooner or later, private capital will come
into Ukraine’s residential services sector:
the question is only how soon and how
effectively. The sooner investors are
convinced that the conditions offered by the
State are carved in stone, the sooner private
capital, including foreign money, will appear.
At the moment, however, only locals are
willing to take the risk. Given their limited
financial resources and lack of experience in
managing residential services, however, local
providers are not the best option.
CE countries provide an example
Central European countries have done a
better job than Ukraine in reforming their
residential services. Yet their systems have
much in common with Ukrainian ones, and
their experience reforming residential
services, for which the EU provided both
financing and standards, can be taken as
an example.
From the very beginning, CE countries
looked at privatization as the key to
reviving residential services. Neither their
cities nor their central governments had
the money to renovate outdated
infrastructure. Once large international
companies came into the sector, they had
enormous positive impact: they introduced
good management practices and persuaded
governments to regulate utility rates using
market/based methods. This was critical:
the cities’ lack of prior experience working
with the private sector had often impeded
reforms, even when the necessary
legislation was in place.
In most CE countries, the appearance of
an independent regulatory body in the
residential services sector was one of the
key elements of reform. The
establishment of such an authority was
conditioned primarily by the need to
maintain the balance of interests between
local governments and sector
monopolists. However, providing such
fundamental services to the general
population is highly politicized, and none
of these countries was able to set up a
regulatory body that was completely
independent of sector ministries and local
authorities.
Still, as utility payments became the main
source of funding for residential services,
political will on the part of local officials
did appear. Certain kinds of costs were
cut with more effective management.
Rising rates were accompanied by
targeted subsidies and minimal water and
gas supplies for the non/working
population (the jobless, pensioners,
invalids, etc.). Notably, these reforms
were promoted through active
information campaigns and numerous
public hearings.
In Ukraine, the commercialization of this
sector—that is, introducing market
principles into the work of residential
service providers and setting up a
regulatory system—is in an embryonic state
(Stage I). Moreover, Poland, Latvia, Hungary
and other CEE countries found moving into
the second stage not without its difficulties
and the process is still not finished.
It is getting more and more difficult for the State to bear the burden of
residential services—water, heating, electricity and building maintenance—
at its sole expense. As a way out of this crisis situation, private capital has to
be attracted to the sector, because it can work more effectively, provided that
appropriate regulation is in place. However, the need to introduce higher utility
rates and other unpopular measures prevents politicians from completing the
reforms already begun in this sector
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Table 1. Main stages in transforming public service enterprises
natural monopolies other residential services 
(public transit, waste disposal)
Stage I: A modest break/up of state/owned Definition and separation of ancillary 
Restructuring monopolies (primary separation of functions
monopolistic assets from non/ Creation of conditions for competition
monopolistic ones)
The establishment 
of an independent regulatory body 
Stage II: De/monopolization (privatization De/monopolization
Privatization of units engaged in non/ Management of public shares and assets 
monopolistic activities) Privatization
Development of regulatory functions 
Price liberalization
Source: 
Navigation to the Market: Regulation and Competition in Local Utilities in Central and Eastern Europe
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• In 2002, nearly 7 billion UAH or 3% of
country’s GDP went to this sector for
services.
• Residential services take up to 15–20%
of the average monthly salary.
• Over 30% of waterworks and sewage
systems are in a very dangerous state.
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Reforms stagnate
When compared to reforms in other
infrastructure areas such as energy and
telecoms, reforms to Ukraine’s residential
services sector are not impressive. The
process of this reform is tied into the
reform of local government, insofar as
oblast and county administrations have
become the owners of enormous physical
assets. Transferring centrally/owned
enterprises to local administrations also
meant handing over financing, pricing and
governance. Despite this decentralization
of direct management of residential
utilities, however, there was never any
clear definition and division of functions
between the center and the regions. To
date, no regulatory system has been
developed in this sector, either.
Among positive achievements in the
sector are much/needed rate hikes for
residential services, although these are
still not at the necessary levels. Before
1990, most Ukrainians paid only 5% of the
cost of residential services; the rest was
covered by the Budget. By 1998, consumer
rates reflected 80% of real costs.
Unfortunately, these costs keep rising:
energy prices grew and, critically, no
measures were taken to improve efficiency.
Thus, by 2000, consumer rates were
covering only 60% of actual costs and
most residential service enterprises were
slipping deeper into the red.
A new relationship
The relationship between municipalities
and residential services investors can take
a wide range of legal forms, the most
pertinent of which are: service contracts,
long/term leases and buy/outs. The choice
will be determined by two major factors:
current legislation (Ukraine places
limitations on the privatization of certain
establishments) and local conditions. The
acceptability of a particular form of
contractual liability also depends on the
financial state of the enterprise in
question.
At this time, two schemes for attracting
private structures into residential services
management are being considered in
Ukraine: transferring waterworks
(vodokanal) and heating plants
(teplokomunenergo) to the management of
utilities and long/term leasing.
Integration with power utilities. Since
residential enterprises are the biggest
deadbeats with regard to power utilities
(oblenergo) and gas companies (oblgas),
more rigorous control on the part of their
suppliers might solve the problem of
timely and complete payment. Residential
service providers are very dependent—
and not only in Ukraine—on energy
supplies. For instance, energy makes up
more than 60% of all costs of supplying
water. Such a scheme would solve the
problems of both the energy sector and
NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy. However, this
scheme makes it unlikely that the long/
term interests of residential service
providers will be taken into account. For
instance, huge energy costs can be
directly connected with outdated and
inefficient equipment, yet upgrading fixed
assets requires substantial investment.
Further merging of power utilities with
residential services could also increase
monopolization in this market and weaken
the influence of local administrations on
residential services.
Leasing. Long/term leases of residential
service enterprises by private business is
the easiest and most legally feasible way
to attract investors. The main drawback is
that the process of leasing these
enterprises is closed to a key stakeholder,
the general public. Weak public control
over local officials encourages corruption
and unfair competition.
Wanted: An effective investor
By “effective”, we mean able to provide an
appropriate level of mutual benefit for all
stakeholders: the State, the investor and
the consumers. The State is mostly
interested in timely, quality services,
preferably without any rate increases. The
investor is interested in return on the
investment. Can both goals be achieved in
Ukraine?
There are plenty of opportunities for
cutting residential services costs: water
and heat loss, sometimes as much as 50%
of the total supply; overstaffed
enterprises; poorly coordinated billing
systems; corruption among managers;
and so on. However, to introduce
efficiencies in these areas, a private
owner will need state support: the right
to cut back staff and cut off the supply to
deadbeat consumers. In short, the
Government has to choose among a
number of unpopular options. It is very
unlikely, however, that it will make any
shocking moves, especially in an election
year: no serious rate hikes, no mass staff
reductions. Thus, despite the substantial
benefits to be gained from cutting costs,
in some regions rate hikes will be
impossible to avoid. To mitigate the
undesirable effects of this reform, the
Government could reform the social
security system and the system of utility
rate regulation.
The cities go first
Pilot projects for reforming residential
services are already underway in many of
Ukraine’s larger cities, for a number of
reasons:
• Urban residents are more used to the
comforts of civilization and can afford
to pay higher rates;
• Population density is higher in cities,
which offers the economies of scale;
• The professionalism of urban
government workers is, as a rule, higher.
In addition, greater political activism
among city/dwellers means that city
officials are more likely to take decisive
actions.
At the initial stage, local initiatives are
having a positive impact. However, the
lack of a unified policy and standards
could result in negative consequences.
Thus, both the legislative and executive
branches of power must follow a policy of
setting equal conditions for carrying out
reforms and managing residential services
in all the regions. This means the areas of
responsibility of the municipalities, private
owners and communal owners, and the role
of the regulatory body must be clearly
defined. For example, it is unlikely that
private owners will worry about
environmental issues or universal access,
without regulation.
Growing differences among regions will
make it more difficult to carry out
nationwide reforms: to try to set national
standards after the fact will mean
revisiting locally/set standards and
already/agreed contracts. Since regions
differ in the level of deterioration of their
physical infrastructure, access to natural
resources, and political activism, the
details of the reform process will differ in
every specific case.
For further details, please contact Ildar
Gazizullin at igazizullin@icps.kiev.ua or at
tel.: +380344323634477.
